The powers of the president, so far as the Constitution defines them in Article II, are as follows:

Section 2:

·         The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States;

·         he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

·         He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur;

·         and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

·         The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

Section 3

·         He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient;

·         he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper;

·         he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers;

·         he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

 The idea of a national chief executive was new. Under the Articles of Confederation, there had been none. The man called the president prior to 1789 presided over the Congress. He didn’t run the country. (There were several presidents before George Washington. They are listed here.)

Creating a national chief executive with a serious role in running the country was an alarming idea. This president, some feared, would have power to do things! Hamilton confirms in #69 and #70 that this is indeed the case. The president envisioned by the Constitution would be a man who would get things done – in short, an energetic man: 

Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy. . .

A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.

 The constitutional president would be powerful, but limited. Hamilton reviews the enumerated powers of the president and compares his prerogatives with those of the king of England, the governor of New York, and other chief executives. In each comparison, Hamilton shows that the American president is more limited.

For example, the president is “commander in chief” of the army and navy. But where the king of England could command armies to be formed and ships to be built, the American president could not. In America, only Congress could raise troops and equip them, and only Congress could declare war.

The presidential power to appoint judges and ambassadors is again more limited. In England (at that time), the king appointed whom he wished. In America, the senate must agree to presidential appointments. Even the governor of New York could appoint judges and fill other government positions more directly than the president.

The president can veto the actions of Congress, just as the king can prohibit English laws. But the king’s word was final. The president’s veto could be overridden by a supermajority of Congress.

By comparing the as yet unknown Constitution with more longstanding and familiar governments, Hamilton assured citizens that the new president’s powers would be moderate. The governor of New York was not to be feared, and the president would have less capability to do mischief than that governor.

From our perspective today, that comparison seems weak because the national government is so much larger than any state. But when Hamilton was writing this essay, the national government was small.

Hamilton makes a couple of weak arguments here. One is that a term of four years would, somehow, ensure good behavior and prevent any abuses of power by presidents:

If we consider how much less time would be requisite for establishing a dangerous influence in a single State, than for establishing a like influence throughout the United States, we must conclude that a duration of FOUR years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is a degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that office, than a duration of THREE years for a corresponding office in a single State.

Hamilton supposes here that presidential abuses would require “establishing dangerous influence” throughout the country. He imagined a theoretical corrupt leader going from town to town building support for some bad purpose. Four years wouldn’t be enough time to do that. Hamilton failed to anticipate the consequences of collecting federal power in Washington DC. With the headquarters of nearly all federal agencies, and all foreign embassies, and many corporate lobbying offices all located in Washington, the work of “establishing dangerous influence” has become easy.

Another weak argument Hamilton makes is the desirability of making the president a single man, rather than an executive committee of three or more. He points to some of the worst historical cases of corrupt committees. But only showing that bad government by committee in ancient Rome could occur was not a compelling argument that good government by committee in America was not possible.

The American executive branch today employs about four million people. There is still a single person — the president — at the top, but the notion of the executive being controlled by a single mind is outdated.

The US presidency that exists in 2020 is hardly recognizable from Hamilton’s comments. The man who holds the office doesn’t recognize Constitutional limitations at all. Article II of the Constitution lists the specific and limited things a president can do. But Trump has insisted repeatedly that Article II of the Constitution gives him unlimited powers:

Trump is wrong to claim that Article II allows him to do anything he wants. But it is certainly true that the modern president exerts powers that are not allowed by the Constitution. Trump may be the first to explicitly misstate his powers so openly and brazenly. But he is not the first to take actions beyond those expressed in Article II.

The words “[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” may imply that the president has all necessary powers to do whatever it takes. The unclear, elastic “necessary and proper” clause in Article I allows Congress to do more than the Constitution specifically states. And supporters of a powerful president can say the last phrase in Section 3 of Article II does the same thing for the president. It is another case of the unwritten constitution exerting influence where the written Constitution fails to make important things clear.